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VENCIL V. VALMONT INDUSTRIES, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vencil v. Valmont Industries, Inc.' solidified an earlier 1991 Ne-
braska Supreme Court ruling that injuries resulting from repetitive
work-related trauma must be compensated as accidents under the Ne-
braska Workers' Compensation Act,2 and may not be compensated as
occupational diseases under the Act.3
This Note analyzes the significance of the court's decision and criti-
cizes the court's reliance on the rule of Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co.,
Inc.4 which the court has construed to mandate that such injuries may
be compensated only as accidents. The Note begins by stating the criti-
cal facts of Vencil and outlining the majority, concurring, and dissent-
ing opinions. A brief history of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation
Act is given, followed by the criteria an injured worker must meet in
order to receive compensation for an accident or an occupational dis-
ease under the Act. The Note then criticizes the rationale of the ma-
jority and points out five problems with the majority's analysis. First,
the majority opinion rests solely on a misinterpretation of its 1980 de-
cision in Crosby v. American Stores.5 Second, the majority decision is
irreconcilable with other prior Nebraska case law. Third, the ruling
has the effect of removing recovery for conditions that meet the crite-
ria for occupational disease under the Act; the court both misreads the
legislative intent and also encroaches upon a legislative function.
Fourth, the decision distances Nebraska from mainstream workers'
compensation law. Finally, the Note analyzes the recent Nebraska
Supreme Court ruling in Schiup v. Auburn Needleworks,6 which viv-
idly illustrates the problems created by the removal of recovery for
occupational diseases from the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.
The Note concludes that the decision reached by the court is unwar-
ranted and will have an adverse effect on injured parties who have
colorable claims for compensation due to occupational diseases under
the Act by forcing the injured employees to seek recovery as accidents
for what are properly characterized as occupational diseases.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Issues
Daniel Vencil began working for Valmont Industries in 1979.
1. 239 Neb. 31, 473 N.W.2d 409 (1991).
2. See generally NEB. REy. STAT. §§ 48-101 to 48-1,110 (Reissue 1988 & Cum. Supp.
1990).
3. See, Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co., Inc., 238 Neb. 209, 212, 469 N.W.2d 542, 544
(1991).
4. A.
5. 207 Neb. 251, 298 N.W.2d 157 (1980).
6. 239 Neb. 854, 479 N.W.2d 440 (1992).
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Vencil performed duties in several different departments at Valmont,
but at all times his duties required him to continuously bend, stoop,
and lift heavy objects. Vencil began to experience low back pain in
1986 or 1987. The pain gradually increased in severity, and Vencil was
forced to undergo corrective surgery on his lower back in 1990. The
physicians who treated Vencil concurred that, although there was no
specific instance of trauma or injury, Vencil's repeated work activity
directly contributed to his condition.7 Alleging that he was injured
either as the result of an accident or an occupational injury, Vencil
sought compensation under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation
Act. The workers' compensation court held that Vencil failed to pres-
ent evidence to establish that he was entitled to workers' compensa-
tion benefits.
B. Majority Opinion
In a per curiam decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court relied ex-
clusively on Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co.8 in finding that the com-
pensability of a condition that is the result of the cumulative effects of
repeated work-related trauma is to be tested under the statutory defi-
nition of "accident" contained in the Act.9 The court noted that the
statute requires, among other things, that the injury must happen
"'suddenly and violently.., producing at the time objective symptoms
of an injury.' "10 The court then stated that the cumulative effects of
work-related trauma that do not produce objective symptoms at an
identifiable moment in time, interrupting the employment and requir-
ing medical attention do not qualify as accidental injury under the Ne-
braska Workers' Compensation Act.11 In testing Vencil's condition
under the statutory definition of "accident", the court held that be-
cause Vencil's symptoms had developed over seven years and required
no interruption of employment until nearly ten years had passed,
Vencil was not entitled to compensation.12
C. Justice Caporale's Concurring Opinion
Justice Caporale reasoned that Vencil was seeking workers' com-
pensation benefits because he was gradually wearing out.13 While he
admitted that some occupations increase the natural wearing-out pro-
cess, Justice Caporale argued that the basis for compensation for such
conditions lies not under workers' compensation law, but under the
7. Vencil v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 239 Neb. 31, 32, 473 N.W.2d 409, 410-11 (1991).
8. 238 Neb. 209, 469 N.W.2d 542 (1991).
9. Vencil v. Valnont Indus., Inc., 239 Neb. 31, 32, 473 N.W.2d 409, 411 (1991).
10. Id. (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. sec. 48-151(2)(Reissue 1988)).
11. Id. (citing Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co., 238 Neb. 209, 469 N.W.2d 542 (1991)).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 41, 473 N.W.2d at 416 (Caporale, J., concurring).
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federal Social Security Act.14 The justice concluded that any policy
decision providing for compensation for cumulative injuries is to be
made by the legislature after full study, debate, and understanding of
the economics involved.15
D. Justice Shanahan's Dissenting Opinion16
Justice Shanahan's dissent provides the basis for this Note. Justice
Shanahan looked past Maxson to the actual language used in Crosby v.
American Stores,17 the case upon which Maxson relied, and concluded
that the court had erred in interpreting Crosby to read that all condi-
tions resulting from cumulative trauma must be tested as accidents
under the Act.1 8 He cited several prior Nebraska cases are cited that
allowed recovery as occupational diseases when in fact the injuries
were the result of the cumulative effects of work-related trauma.1 9
Justice Shanahan criticized the majority holding as narrowing the Ne-
braska Workers' Compensation Act and warned that the narrow con-
struction of the occupational disease statute would eventually squeeze
"occupational disease" out of the Act.20 The justice rejected the ma-
jority decision that left it to the legislature to reform the definition of
"occupational disease," 21 correctly reading the existing statute to in-
clude compensation for the cumulative effects of work-related trauma.
Justice Shanahan's dissent concluded that since Vencil proved a prima
facie case that he suffered from an occupational disease, the decision
of the compensation court was clearly erroneous.2 2
14. Id at 41-42, 473 N.W.2d at 416 (Caporale, J., concurring) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423
(1988)).
15. Vencil v. Valmont Indus., 239 Neb. 31,42, 473 N.W.2d 409, 416 (1991)(Caporale, J.,
concurring).
16. Justice Grant also dissented to the decision; however, Justice Grant would have
compensated Vencil's injury as an accident under the Act. For a discussion of the
problems in attempting to compensate such an injury as an accident rather than
as an occupational disease, see infra notes 110-129 and accompanying text.
17. 207 Neb. 251, 298 N.W.2d 157 (1980).
18. Vencil v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 239 Neb. 31, 38-39, 473 N.W.2d 409, 414
(1991)(Shanahan, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 34-35, 473 N.W.2d at 412. For the cases compensating cumulative injuries as
occupational diseases, see infra note 72 and accompanying text.
20. Id. at 40, 473 N.W.2d at 415.
21. Id
22. Id. at 41, 473 N.W.2d at 415.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act
1. History
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, passed in 1913,23 pro-
vided a legislative remedy to injured workers that was intended to re-
place the traditional common law tort remedy of negligence.24 Prior
to the enactment of the Workers' Compensation Act, workers who
were injured on the job could recover only under tort law. However,
judicial application of the defenses of contributory negligence, as-
sumption of the risk, and the fellow servant doctrine25 made recovery
under tort law uncertain and inadequate.26 As the industrial revolu-
tion expanded, the number of work-place accidents increased dramati-
cally; consequently, as the awards under tort law became more
frequent, states began to recognize the need for a compensation sys-
tem that would be more effective than traditional tort remedies. 27
Wisconsin was the first state to pass a workers' compensation statute
that was upheld by the courts,28 and other states soon followed. By
1920 all but eight states had passed workers' compensation acts.29
Proponents of such legislation argue that workers' compensation
provides a more certain, humanitarian system of compensation to in-
jured employees.30 In exchange for this certainty, workers' compensa-
tion statutes require that the worker relinquishes the right to proceed
under tort law.31 Nebraska courts recognize, however, that the pri-
mary purpose of the Act is to compensate injured employees for the
23. NEB. REV. STAT. § 3642 (1913)(current version at NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-101 (Reis-
sue 1988)).
24. See 1 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKM:EN's COMPENSATION LAW §§ 5.20, 5.30 at 37-40
(1991).
25. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at
569-572 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing generally the "unholy trinity" defenses to recov-
ery under tort law); see generally, Paul R. Gurtler, Comment, The Workers' Corn-
pensation Principle: A Historical Abstract of the Nature of Workers'
Compensation, 9 HAMLINE J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 285 (1989).
26. 1 LARSON, supra note 24, § 4.30, at 27-28. Larson calculated that the application of
the three defenses completely removed the liability of the employer in at least
83% of all cases.
27. See generally Ellen R. Peirce and Terry M. Dworkin, Workers' Compensation
and Occupational Disease: A Return to Original Intent, 67 OR. L. REV. 649, 652
(1988).
28. E.g., Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N.W. 209 (Wis. 1911).
29. 1 LARSON, supra note 24, § 5.30, at 39.
30. See Peirce and Dworkin, supra note 27, at 652.
31. See Neb. Rev. Stat § 48-148 (Reissue 1988). The court has held that the Act pro-
vides the exclusive remedy by an employee against the employer for any injury
arising out of and in the course of employment. Johnston v. State, 219 Neb. 457,
462, 364 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1985).
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loss of their earning power3 2 and to place the cost of work-place inju-
ries on the industry and its customers rather than on individual work-
ers33 or the general public.3 4 In order to give full effect to the purpose
of the Act, Nebraska courts have consistently held that the Act must
be liberally construed35 and have stated that technical rules of inter-
pretation are to be avoided as much as possible.36
2. Recovery for an Accident Sustained at Work
The Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act provides that an em-
ployee who sustains a personal injury at work that is caused by an
accident or an occupational disease shall receive compensation from
the employer provided that the employee was not willfully negligent
at the time of the accident.37 The Act defines "accident" as an "unex-
pected or unforeseen injury happening suddenly and violently, with or
without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of
an injury."38 The statutory definition of "accident," therefore, con-
tains three separate elements which must be met in order to permit
the employee to recover.39 The basic and essential element of an "ac-
cident" is that it is unexpected.40 The Nebraska Supreme Court has
stated that the "by accident" requirement of the Act is satisfied if
either the cause of the injury was of an accidental character or if the
effect was unexpected or unforeseen.41 The second element that must
be met requires that the injury occur "suddenly and violently." With
regard to this requirement, the court has stated that for the purposes
of the Act, "suddenly and violently" does not mean "instantaneously
and with force" but rather that the injury occur at an identifiable
point in time requiring the employee to discontinue employment and
32. E.g., Warner v. State, 190 Neb. 643, 644, 211 N.W.2d 408, 410 (1973) (stating the
purpose of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act).
33. E.g., Tralle v. Hartman Furniture & Carpet Co., 116 Neb. 418, 423, 217 N.W. 952,
954 (1928)(stating that the workers' compensation law is meant to shift the bur-
den of economic loss from the employee to the industry).
34. Hayes v. McMullen, 128 Neb. 432, 435, 259 N.W. 165, 167 (Neb. 1935).
35. See Union Packing Co. of Omaha v. Klauschie, 210 Neb. 331, 336, 314 N.W.2d 25,
29 (1982)(quoting White v. Western Commodities, Inc., 207 Neb. 76, 86, 295
N.W.2d (1980)) (stating that the Act should be liberally construed to include by
liberal interpretation all injuries arising out of the course of employment that are
not clearly excluded).
36. E.g., Hauff v. Kimball, 163 Neb. 55, 64, 77 N.W.2d 683, 688 (1956).
37. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-101 (Reissue 1988).
38. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(2) (Reissue 1988).
39. Sandel v. Packaging Co. of America, 211 Neb. 149, 156, 317 N.W.2d 910, 915 (1982).
40. See Masters v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 220 Neb. 835, 374 N.W.2d 21
(1985)(holding that because, among other things, the accident was unexpected
and unforeseen, it was a compensable accident).
41. Eliker v. D.H. Merritt & Sons, 195 Neb. 154,158,237 N.W.2d 130,133 (1975) (citing
Brokaw v. Robinson, 183 Neb. 760, 763, 164 N.W.2d 461, 464 (1969)).
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seek medical attention.4 2 The third requirement of the Act, that the
injury produce objective symptoms, is satisfied if the symptoms mani-
fest themselves naturally, without any independent intervening
cause. 43
3. Recovery for an Occupational Disease Sustained at Work
An injured worker can also seek compensation under the Act for
an injury which is the result of an occupational disease.44 The Act de-
fines "occupational disease" as "only a disease which is due to causes
and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular
trade, occupation, process, or employment."45 As such, all ordinary
diseases of life to which the general public is exposed are excluded.46
The Act itself does not define "disease"; however, the court has recog-
nized a definition of disease to be:
[A]n impairment of the normal state of the living animal or plant body or of
any of its components that interrupts or modifies the performance of the vital
functions, being a response to environmental factors (as malnutrition, indus-
trial hazards, or climate), to specific infective agents (as worms, bacteria, or
viruses), to inherent defects of the organism (as various genetic anomalies), or
to combinations of these factors.
4 7
While the Act requires that the cause and conditions of the disease be
characteristic of and peculiar to the employment, it does not require
that the disease originate exclusively from employment.48 The statute
merely requires that the conditions of the employment result in a haz-
ard to the employee which makes that particular employment distin-
guishable from employment in general.49
4. Distinctions Between "Occupational Diseases" and
"Accidents"
Occupational diseases were unknown at common law and were
therefore not compensable under the original workers' compensation
statutes. Because many employees were injured from work-related
conditions but were unable to point to specific accidents, courts began
to abandon the strict construction of the accident requirements and
began to compensate those types of conditions as occupational dis-
42. Sandel v. Packaging Co. of America, 211 Neb. 149, 158, 317 N.W.2d 910, 916 (1982).
43. E.g., Wolfe v. American Community Stores, 205 Neb. 763, 767, 290 N.W.2d 195, 198
(1980).
44. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-101 (Reissue 1988).
45. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(3) (Reissue 1988).
46. Id.
47. Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co., 238 Neb. 209, 212, 469 N.W.2d 542, 544 (1991)
(quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 648 (1981)).
48. E.g., Ritter v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 178 Neb. 792, 795, 135 N.W.2d 470, 472
(1965).
49. Id.
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eases.50 Occupational diseases differ from accidental injuries in two
ways: (1) occupational diseases are not "unexpected" in the sense that
they are unforeseeable, and (2) occupational diseases are gradual
rather than sudden in onset.51 Because all states now provide general
compensation coverage for occupational diseases,52 the distinction be-
tween "accident" and "occupational disease" has gradually lost its im-
portance, and awards are frequently made without specifying which
category the injury falls under.5 3 However, if the court were to find
that a particular injury could only be brought under the definition of
accident, not only would one method of seeking compensation be re-
moved, but the employee would be faced with the same difficulty em-
ployees faced before the recognition of occupational disease coverage:
The employee's injury would not fit neatly within the statutory defini-
tion of "accident." Both Vencil v. Valmont Industries, Inc. and Max-
son v. Michael Todd & Co., Inc. are cases in which plaintiffs who
suffered from occupational diseases did not recover compensation for
their injuries because they failed to meet the statutory elements of
"accident." In Schlup v. Auburn Needleworks, in contrast, a plaintiff
who suffered from a cumulative injury nevertheless was able to force
her condition within the narrow confines of "accident" and therefore
recovered for her injury.
B. Criticism of Vencil v. Valmont Industries, Inc.
The decision in Vencil simply reiterated the findings of the court
in Maxson. Had the Vencil court examined Crosby v. American
Stores5 it would have realized that the ostensible rule of Maxson is
the result of a misinterpretation of Crosby. By its decision in Vencil,
the court has simultaneously removed an avenue of recovery under
the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, overruled prior case law,
encroached upon an area that is reserved for the legislature, distanced
Nebraska from mainstream worker's compensation law, and provided
uncertainty for injured employees who seek compensation under the
Act.
1. Vencil is the Result of Maxson's Misinterpretation of Crosby
The problems the Nebraska Supreme Court has created with re-
gard to workers' compensation law in Vencil are the result of building
on a faulty base. Vencil relied exclusively on Maxson, which provided
the "rule" that cumulative injuries are only to be compensated as acci-
50. Peirce and Dworkin, supra note 27, at 656-57.
51. 1B LARSON, supra note 24, § 41.31, at 7-491 to 7-492.
52. 1B id. § 41.00 at 7-480.
53. IB id. § 41.31 at 7-491.
54. 207 Neb. 251, 298 N.W.2d 157 (1980).
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dents. Maxson, however, was based on a misreading of Crosby, which
clearly does not stand for the proposition that cumulative injuries may
only be compensated as accidents. Therefore, an analysis of the argu-
ments and reasoning of Crosby and Maxson provides support for the
criticism of the result reached in Vencil.
a. Analysis of Crosby
The plaintiff in Crosby suffered from a condition that was the re-
sult of the cumulative effects of work-related trauma. The plaintiff
contracted carpal tunnel syndrome from a job that required her to re-
peatedly strike pallets with the palms of her hands. The plaintiff's
hands began to swell on her first day on the job, and within ten days
she was forced to seek medical treatment.5 5 The plaintiff sought com-
pensation, alleging that she was injured as the result of either an acci-
dent or an occupational disease. At the initial hearing before a single
judge of the compensation court, the court allowed recovery on the
theory that the plaintiff was injured as a result of an occupational dis-
ease. 56 The compensation court affirmed the award in a determina-
tion on rehearing, but found that the plaintiff's condition was
compensable as an accident under the Act.57 On appeal, the employer
argued that the compensation court erred in finding that the plaintiff
was injured as the result of an accident. The employer contended that
the evidence would fail to sustain a finding that the plaintiff was in-
jured as the result of either an accident or an occupational disease.58
The court in Crosby found that the analysis of the compensation
court on rehearing was correct.5 9 The court analyzed the conditions of
the plaintiff's injuries under the statutory definitions of an accident
and occupational disease and found that carpal tunnel syndrome has
some of the characteristics of both an accident and an occupational
disease. The finding of the compensation court which had allowed re-
covery on the basis of accident was therefore affirmed.60
b. Analysis of Maxson
Maxson, the controlling case in Vencil, involved a plaintiff whose
job required heavy lifting, bending, and stooping. During eighteen
years of employment the plaintiff experienced back, shoulder, and
arm discomfort which gradually progressed to the point where the
plaintiff could not work. The plaintiff applied for compensation, alleg-
ing a job-related injury caused alternatively by an accident or an occu-
55. Id. at 253, 298 N.W.2d at 158 (1980).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 253, 298 N.W.2d at 159.
58. Id. at 253-54, 298 N.W.2d at 159.
59. Id. at 255, 298 N.W. 2d at 159.
60. Id.
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pational disease.6 1 The workers' compensation court determined that
the evidence failed to establish that the plaintiff suffered an injury as
the result of either an accident or an occupational disease6 2 and dis-
missed the action.
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff's
injury was the result of the cumulative effects of work-related trauma,
and that such a condition has some of the elements of both an acciden-
tal injury and an occupational disease.63 The court then mistakenly
interpreted Crosby v. American Stores to state that the compensability
of a condition that is the result of the cumulative effects of work-re-
lated trauma must be tested under the statutory definition of "acci-
dent."64 The court applied the requirements set forth in the statutory
definition of "accident" 65 and quoted Sandel v. Packaging Co. of
America66 in stating that the "suddenly and violently" requirement of
the statute is met only if the injury occurs at an identifiable point in
time requiring the employee to discontinue employment and seek
medical treatment.6 7 Maxson concluded that because the cumulative
effects of the work-related trauma to the plaintiff's back and shoulder
did not produce objective symptoms at an identifiable moment that
required medical attention and the interruption or discontinuance of
employment, the injury was not compensable as an accident under the
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.68
My criticism of Maxson stems from its interpretation of Crosby.
The Maxson "rule" is that the cumulative-effect type conditions of all
three of the plaintiffs in Vencil, Maxson and Crosby must be tested as
accidents.6 9 A careful reading of Crosby, however, reveals that the
court did not make such a statement. A realistic reading of Crosby is
that the court simply agreed with the rehearing court in holding that
the plaintiff's condition was compensable as an accident and affirmed
that judgment without adjudicating the issue of whether the condition
was compensable as an occupational disease as well. A factor which
may have caused confusion and contributed to the misinterpretation
was that the court in Crosby discussed the elements of an occupational
disease, when the only real issue was whether an accident had oc-
curred. This may have led the Maxson court to believe that because
61. Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co., 238 Neb. 209, 469 N.W.2d 542 (1991).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 212, 469 N.W.2d at 544.
64. Id. (stating that the compensability of a condition that is the result of the cumula-
tive effects of repeated trauma is to be tested as an accident).
65. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(2) (Reissue 1988).
66. 211 Neb. 149, 158, 317 N.W.2d 910, 916 (1982).
67. Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co., 238 Neb. 209, 212, 469 N.W.2d 542, 544 (1991).
68. Id. at 213, 469 N.W.2d at 545. For a further discussion of the court's analysis of an
"identifiable point in time", see infra note 129 and accompanying text.
69. See Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co., 238 Neb. 209, 212, 469 N.W.2d 542, 544 (1991).
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the Crosby court found that the plaintiff's condition had the charac-
teristics of an occupational disease but awarded compensation exclu-
sively on the basis of an accident, the Crosby court was formulating a
rule that such a condition was limited to the definition of accident.
Whatever the reason for the misinterpretation, however, the ostensi-
ble rule in Maxson is not supported by the ruling of the court in
Crosby. The anomalous effect of the misinterpretation is easily seen:
An employee who is injured from what is clearly recognizable as an
occupational disease within the criteria contained in the Act7O is usu-
ally precluded from compensation due to failure to meet the stricter
statutory criteria of an accident. 71
2. Vencil is not Supported by Nebraska Case Law
As the above argument demonstrates, Crosby offers no support for
the proposition that the injury suffered by Vencil may not be compen-
sated as an occupational disease. Furthermore, there is no prior Ne-
braska case law that stands for the proposition that the cumulative-
effect type injuries suffered by the plaintiffs in Maxson and Vencil
may not be compensable as occupational diseases under the Act. In-
deed, a study of several Nebraska cases that contain injuries analogous
to the injuries suffered by Vencil and Maxson would indicate that
such injuries are occupational diseases and are compensable as such.7 2
An example of a condition that is the result of the accumulation of
repeated work-related trauma is contained in Hauff v. Kimball.7 3 In
Hauff, the plaintiff was a granite cutter who was exposed to extreme
amounts of silica dust for thirty-two years. The repeated exposure to
the silica dust led to pneumoconiosis silicosis, a respiratory disease
which disabled and eventually killed the plaintiff. The Hauff court
stated that a latent injury, progressive in nature, which results in com-
pensable disability occurs within the meaning of the Act when the
condition produced by the injury culminates over time.7 4 The plaintiff
was compensated under the Act for an injury sustained due to an occu-
pational disease.75
There are obviously some relevant differences between a back in-
70. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(3) (Reissue 1988).
71. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(2) (Reissue 1988).
72. See, e.g., Osteen v. A.C. and S., Inc., 209 Neb. 282, 307 N.W.2d 514 (1981)(perito-
neal mesothelioma, a form of abdominal cancer caused by repeated exposure to
asbestos, was a compensable occupational disease); Ritter v. Hawkeye-Security
Ins. Co., 178 Neb. 792, 135 N.W.2d 470 (1965)(contact dermatitis gradually caused
by repeated exposure to solvents was a compensable occupational disease); Riggs
v. Gooch Milling and Elevator Co., 173 Neb. 70,112 N.W.2d 531 (1961)(emphysema
caused by repeated inhalation of wheat dust was an occupational disease).
73. 163 Neb. 55, 77 N.W.2d 683 (1956).
74. Id. at 61, 77 N.W.2d at 687.
75. Id. at 64, 77 N.W.2d at 688.
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jury and silicosis. For example, a back injury could arguably be seen
as being an injury that the general public is exposed to in everyday
life, while silicosis clearly is not. The importance of Hauff, however,
is not that silicosis was held to be an occupational disease, but that the
court tested the cumulative condition under the statutory definition of
occupational disease. Hauff, clearly an example of a condition result-
ing from the cumulative effects of repeated work-related trauma,
stands for the proposition that such injuries may be compensable as
occupational diseases and may be tested as such under the Act. In
holding that Crosby stands for the principle that such conditions may
only be tested under the statutory definition of accident,7 6 the court
has hardly adopted a liberal interpretation of the Act.7 7 By its con-
stricting interpretation of the Act, the court has surreptitiously over-
ruled prior case law.
3. Vencil Results in Both a Judicial Encroachment upon a
Legislative Function and a Misinterpretation of
Legislative Intent
The Nebraska Constitution delegates to the legislature the power
to declare and amend law.78 The Nebraska Legislature amended the
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act in 1943 to specifically include
compensation for injuries sustained from occupational diseases.79 By
its very enactment, the legislature created a statutory cause of action
under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act and defined the cri-
teria for recovery.8 0 By removing a condition that meets the statutory
criteria for compensability under the definition of occupational disease
and restricting recovery to only those plaintiffs who can meet the stat-
utory criteria of an accident under the Act, the court has in fact re-
moved the definition of occupational disease from Nebraska law and
thwarted the legislature's intent to compensate cumulative-effect type
injuries that meet the statutory definition of occupational disease.
This judicial encroachment into the legislative branch not only vio-
lates the Nebraska Constitution,8 1 but also contradicts years of case
76. See Vencil v. Valnont Indus., Inc., 239 Neb. 31, 32, 473 N.W.2d 409, 411 (1991),
Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co., 238 Neb. 209, 212, 469 N.W.2d 542, 544 (1991).
77. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
78. Neb. Const. art. M, § 1.
79. Act of May 28, 1943, ch. 113, 1943 Neb. Laws 397 (amending § 48-101 to include
compensation for injuries caused by occupational diseases).
80. The amended Act provided that injuries arising out of accidents or occupational
diseases were to be compensated. The Act used the identical definition of "occu-
pational disease" as is presently used. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-152 (1943)(current
version at NEB. REV. STAT. sec. 48-151(3)(Reissue 1988)).
81. Neb. Const. art. II, § 1. The pertinent language of art. II, § 1 is that "no person or
collection of persons being one of these departments, shall exercise any power
properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter expressly di-
rected or permitted."
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law consistent with the Act that has compensated plaintiffs who have
sustained cumulative-effect injuries.8 2
An examination of the legislative history of the occupational dis-
ease statute provides no support for the contention that the legislature
did not intend to compensate cumulative injuries as occupational dis-
eases. The 1943 amendment clearly sets forth the requirements for
recovery for occupational diseases, and nowhere mentions that com-
pensation is to be precluded for any particular types of injuries that
otherwise meet the statutory criteria.8 3 Neither the 1963 amend-
ments84 nor the 1986 amendment5 of the occupational disease defini-
tion contain any indication that cumulative-effects injuries that meet
the statutory criteria of "occupational disease" may not be compen-
sated as such. Moreover, nowhere in the legislative history concerning
occupational diseases does it appear that the legislature intended to
preclude cumulative-effects injuries from being compensated as occu-
pational diseases.86 Because the legislature has amended the occupa-
tional disease definition several times and has retained the same
definition that has always been used, it may be inferred that the legis-
lature's intent is that all injuries, including those caused by cumula-
tive trauma, which meet the statutory requirements of the
occupational disease statute are to be compensated.
Senator Will's introduction of Legislative Bill 936 on January 8,
1992 was an attempt to remedy the court's failed reading of the legisla-
ture's intent. If passed, L.B. 936 would have amended § 48-151 and
redefined the term "occupational disease" to include cumulative
trauma.8 7 Unfortunately for employees in Nebraska, L.B. 936 was not
a priority bill. In light of the attention given to Nebraska's personal
property tax problems,8 8 it is not surprising that the legislature did
not address L.B. 936. Senator Will apparently recognized that L.B. 936
itself would not be addressed; therefore, on March 25, 1992 Senator
Will attempted to amend the definition of "occupational disease" by
82. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 79.
84. Act of April 9, 1963, ch. 284, 1963 Neb. Laws 852; Act of July 5, 1963, ch. 287, 1963
Neb. Laws 863.
85. Act of March 18, 1986, L.B. 811, 1986 Neb. Laws 1113.
86. See, e.g., Nebraska Legislative Journal, 56th Sess., at 206 (1943); Nebraska Legis-
lative Journal, 73rd Sess., at 2214-15 (1963); Nebraska Legislative Journal, 89th
Leg., 2d Sess., 1395-96 (1986).
87. L.B. 936, 92d Leg., 2d Sess. (1992). The proposed language of § 48-151(3) would
have defined occupational disease as "only a disease which is due to causes and
conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupa-
tion, process, or employment, including cumulative trauma, and shall exclude all
ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed."
88. See generally MAPCO v. State Bd. of Equalization, 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734
(1991).
[Vol. 71:964
VENCIL V. VALMONT INDUSTRIES, INC.
offering a substitute amendment to L.B. 360.89 The attempted amend-
ment to L.B. 360 contained the identical language of L.B. 936 and
would have redefined "occupational disease" to include injuries caused
by cumulative trauma.9o However, the Will amendment to L.B. 360
was defeated.91
The defeat of the Will amendment should be read in light of the
timing of the vote in the legislative session. There was little discussion
to the merits of the amendment, and the amendment, while defeated,
did garner twenty votes in favor of the amendment against only thir-
teen votes opposed to the amendment.92 Therefore, it would be incon-
gruous to interpret the failed amendment as meaning that the
legislature intends that cumulative injuries may not be recovered as
occupational diseases. A more correct reading of the failed amend-
ment would be that the legislature simply declined to amend a pend-
ing bill, in consideration of the time constraints of the legislative
session, without a full determination of the merits of the proposed
amendment.
It is doubtful that the Nebraska Supreme Court will adopt such a
liberal interpretation of the failed amendment to L.B. 360. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court has adhered to a policy of retaining a judicial
interpretation of a statute in the absence of a legislative amendment to
that statute.93 Therefore, because the court has interpreted § 48-151,
albeit incorrectly, it is unlikely that the court will now revert to the
correct interpretation of the statute and test cumulative injuries as oc-
cupational diseases rather than accidents. It is more likely that the
court will view the failure of the Will amendment as an indorsement
of the current interpretation of the Act which forbids cumulative inju-
ries from being compensated as occupational diseases.
4. Vencil Distances Nebraska from Mainstream Workers'
Compensation Law
Occupational diseases are compensable under the workers' com-
pensation acts of all states, the District of Columbia, and under the
89. L.B. 360 was intended to streamline the appeals process of the Workers' Compen-
sation Court by eliminating rehearings and by changing procedure for workers'
compensation proceedings. L.B. 360, 92d Leg., 1st Sess., 1991 Neb. Laws 163.
90. See Nebraska Legislative Journal, 92d Leg., 2d Sess., 1586-89 (1992).
91. The Will amendment lost with 20 votes in favor of the amendment, 13 votes
against the amendment, seven senators present but not voting, and nine senators
excused and not voting. Nebraska Legislative Journal, 92d Leg., 2d Sess., 1588-89
(1992).
92. Id.
93. E.g., Miller v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 239 Neb. 1014, 1022, 480 N.W.2d 162,
168 (1992) (stating that when a judicial interpretation of a statute has not evoked
a legislative amendment, it is presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced in the
court's interpretation).
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Federal Employees' Liability Act.94 Compensation is covered in vari-
ous ways, including coverage by a general definition of occupational
disease,95 by a broad use of the term "injury",96 under an unrestricted
coverage of disease,97 by an entirely separate act,98 and by a scheduled
list followed by a catch-all provision.99 The central object of occupa-
tional disease definitions is to distinguish them from diseases which
may just as readily be contracted by the public in everyday life.100 Pro-
fessor Larson's extensive treatise on worker's compensation101 deals
generally with the definition of occupational disease:
The term "disease" is construed in its broadest dictionary meaning of any "se-
rious derangement of health" or "disordered state of an organism or organ."
Thus, back strain, herniated disk... deterioration of a toe joint... rheumatoid
arthritis... gradual paralysis of arm and diaphragm from aggravation of tho-
racic outlet syndrome... bronchitis... have been held compensable as occu-
pational diseases, when produced or aggravated by the distinctive conditions
or exertions of the employment.1 0 2
Each of the above conditions may logically be seen as the gradual, cu-
mulative result of repetitive work-related trauma that does not mani-
fest itself at an identifiable time so that the worker must interrupt his
employment and seek immediate medical attention. Each of these
conditions, however, are generally recognized to be occupational dis-
eases by a majority of jurisdictions.O3
Injuries which result from the cumulative effects of repeated
trauma have long been specifically recognized as compensable occupa-
tional diseases. In compensating one such injury as an occupational
disease, the California Appellate Court has stated that "[t]he fragmen-
tation of injury, the splintering of symptoms into small pieces, the at-
omization of pain into minor twinges, the piecemeal contribution of
work-effect to final collapse, does not negate injury. The injury is still
94. 1B LARSON, supra note 24, § 41.10, at 7-480.
95. E.g., Ala. Code § 25-5-110(1) (1986).
96. E.g., Cal. Labor Code § 3208 (West 1989).
97. E.g., Wis. Stat. § 102.01(2)(c)(1988).
98. E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-103 (Curn. Supp. 1992).
99. E.g., Idaho Code § 72-102(18)(Cum. Supp. 1992). See generally 1B LARSON, supra
note 24, § 41.10, at 7-480 to 7-486.
100. 1B LARSON, supra note 24, § 41.33, at 7-504.
101. See generally LARSON, WORKIMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1991).
102. 1B LARSON, supra note 24, § 41.42, at 7-545 to 7-558 (footnotes omitted).
103. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Henley, 400 So. 2d 412 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (disability
caused by gradual infliction of bronchial asthma held an occupational disease);
Venable v. John P. King Mfg. Co., 331 S.E.2d 638 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)(byssinosis
resulting from repeated exposure to cotton dust held an occupational disease);
Norton v. C.P. Blouin, Inc., 511 A.2d 1056 (Me. 1986) (cumulative effect of expo-
sure to asbestos was within the occupational disease statute); Wayland Health
Ctr. v. Lowe, 475 A.2d 1037 (R.I. 1984) (dermatitis contracted from repeated expo-
sure to industrial agents held an occupational disease); Hannah v. Workers' Com-
pensation Comm'r, 346 S.E.2d 757 (W.Va. 1986) (noise-induced gradual hearing
loss is a compensable occupational disease).
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there, even if manifested in disintegrated rather than in total, single
impact."1 04 A recent Illinois decision has likewise found that cumula-
tive effects injuries are compensable, not as occupational diseases, but
under an expanded use of the term "injury."105 The Illinois Appellate
Court stated that "[t]he time has come to abandon an interpretation of
'accidental' which fails to address documentable and medically recog-
nizable risks faced by individuals in connection with their employ-
ment. The risk of injury from repeated trauma and exposure.., must
be recognized." 106
Many courts have specifically found that the same types of back
injuries suffered by the plaintiffs in Vencil and Maxson are compensa-
ble as occupational diseases.0 7 However, there are several courts that
have found that certain cumulative-effects back injuries are not com-
pensable under the applicable occupational disease statute.10 8 All of
the cases denying compensation, however, have done so because the
plaintiff failed to establish a stated statutory criteria, such as the re-
quirement that the disease must not be common to the general pub-
lic.109 In all of the cases allowing and denying compensation for
cumulative injuries, the common thread is that the court has tested
104. Beveridge v. Indus. Accident Comm'n., 346 P.2d 545, 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
105. See Peoria County Belwood Nursing Home v. Indus. Comm'n, 487 N.E.2d 356 (M1.
App. Ct. 1985), qff'd, 505 N.E.2d 1026 (Ill. 1987).
106. Id. at 359.
107. See, e.g., Fruehauf Corp. v. Workmens' Compensation App. Bd., 440 P.2d 236 (Cal.
1968)(repeated series of trauma to employee's back that were cumulative in na-
ture held an occupational disease); Gibson v. Todd Shipyard Corp., 138 A.2d 543
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958)(ventral hernia that is result of a long series of
trauma compensable as occupational disease); Ross v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp., 261 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965)(herniated disk caused by twenty
years of lifting heavy weights held an occupational disease); Shelby Mut. Ins. v.
Dept. of Indus., 327 N.W.2d 178 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982)(repeated back injuries are to
be compensated as occupational disease); see also Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v. Leisure, 675
S.W.2d 841 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984)(tenosynovitis, a wrist condition incurred by re-
petitive heavy lifting held a compensable occupational disease).
108. See, e.g., Downs v. Indus. Comm'n, 493 N.E.2d 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)(plaintiff
failed to present evidence that back injury was a risk increased by employment);
Griffitts v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 309 S.E.2d 277 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)(degen-
erative back injury not compensable for failure to show condition was character-
istic of and particular to claimant's work).
109. But see Western Elec. Co. v. Gilliam, 329 S.E.2d 13 (Va. 1985). The court held that
the claimant's tenosynovitis was an ordinary disease of life, and was not covered
by the workers' compensation act unless it fell within two statutorily created ex-
ceptions. The court noted that the Virginia Legislature had repealed the sched-
uled list of occupational diseases, which included the claimant's condition, and
concluded that by doing so the legislature had intended to narrow the coverage of
the act. The court ultimately held that the condition did not fit within an excep-
tion and denied compensation. Id. at 14. The Virginia Legislature responded to
Gilliam by amending the workers' compensation act to make ordinary diseases of
life compensable if they are sufficiently related to the claimant's employment.
See Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 365 S.E.2d 782, 786 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
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the condition under the statutory definition of an occupational disease,
thus preserving recovery for occupational diseases within the statu-
tory scheme. No court, other than the court in Maxson, has gone so
far as to rule that cumulative-effects conditions may only be tested as
accidental injuries. In formulating the Maxson rule, the court has pre-
cluded recovery for a condition that is generally recognized as a com-
pensable occupational disease and has distanced Nebraska from the
mainstream of workers' compensation law.
5. The Maxson Rule Promotes an Uncertain and Inconsistent
Application of "Accident"
The court's decisions in Vencil and Maxson have an adverse and
unfortunate effect on employees who are seeking compensation for
cumulative-effects injuries under the occupational disease provision of
the Nebraska Workers Compensation Act. The effect of the rule,
however, is not limited to the distortion it causes to the concept of
occupational diseases. The Maxson "rule" also leads to arbitrary and
inconsistent applications of the statutory definition of "accident."
The most recent Nebraska case dealing with the issue of cumula-
tive injuries is Schlup v. Auburn Needleworks.11o In Schlup, the court
reinforced the Maxson rule that cumulative-effects conditions may not
be compensated as occupational diseases.11 Nevertheless, the em-
ployee in Schlup was compensated under the accident provision of the
Act. An analysis of Schlup reveals the continued distortion of the Ne-
braska Workers' Compensation Act caused by Maxson's incorrect in-
terpretation of Crosby v. American Stores.112
In Schlup, the plaintiff had been employed intermittently with the
defendant Auburn Needleworks for a period of thirty-four years. Her
final period of employment with Auburn Needleworks began in 1982
and lasted until 1987. During the last year of her employment, the
plaintiff was required to pull, tug, and push heavy denim through a
sewing machine. In early 1987, the plaintiff began to experience se-
vere discomfort in her fingers and arms. The pain eventually wors-
ened and on May 8, 1987 the plaintiff was forced to seek medical
attention. The plaintiff's ailment was diagnosed as bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome."13
In the physician's opinion, the carpal tunnel syndrome was either
caused by or worsened by the repetitive heavy hand movement that
the plaintiff performed while on the assembly line.114 In February of
1987, the plaintiff was diagnosed as suffering from reflex sympathetic
110. 239 Neb. 854, 479 N.W.2d 440 (1992).
111. Id. at 860, 479 N.W.2d at 445.
112. 207 Neb. 251, 298 N.W.2d 157 (1980).
113. Schiup v. Auburn Needleworks, 239 Neb. 854, 858, 479 N.W.2d 440, 444 (1992).
114. Id.
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dystrophy in her hands, which is a physical condition that causes con-
tinued pain after the initial catalyst of the pain is removed. In June of
1988, the plaintiff was cleared to return to work but was restricted
from any employment that required repetitive hand movements or
even light lifting.115
The plaintiff filed a claim for worker's compensation and alleged
that she had sustained a work-related injury due to an a accident
under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.116 The rehearing
court allowed a recovery of permanent and total disability on the the-
ory that the plaintiff had suffered an accident within the meaning of
the Act. The defendant appealed the decision of the rehearing court
allowing recovery on the basis of an accident.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the rehear-
ing court and agreed that the plaintiff had suffered a work-related in-
jury due to an accident. The court first adhered to the Maxson rule
and excluded the possibility of compensating the plaintiff's cumula-
tive condition as an occupational disease.lT7 The court then tested the
injury under the three requirements of an accident contained in the
Act.
The court first found that the plaintiff could not have foreseen the
injury and therefore held that the "unexpected or unforeseen" re-
quirement of the Act was satisfied.118 With regard to the requirement
that the injury occur "suddenly and violently", the court found that
the injury had occurred at a sufficiently identifiable time to allow
compensation. The court then attempted to distinguish Schlup from
Vencil on the basis that the plaintiff's symptoms could be traced to
the job on the production line. However, the court made no attempt to
actually identify the precise point at which an injury occurred. In-
stead, the court pointed to the first visit to the doctor in May of 1987
and concluded that the first visit was a sufficient basis from which to
conclude that the second requirement of the statute had been satis-
fied.139 Finally, the court found that the symptoms of the injury plain-
tiff were manifested when the plaintiff found that she could not
continue her work. The court concluded that the plaintiff's condition
was sufficient to allow compensation under the statutory definition of
accident contained in the Act.32 0
Justice Shanahan concurred in the decision to compensate the
115. Id.
116. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-101 (Reissue 1988).
117. Schlup v. Auburn Needleworks, 239 Neb. 854, 860, 479 N.W.2d 440, 445 (1992)
(quoting Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co., 238 Neb. 209, 212, 469 N.W.2d 542, 544
(1991)).
118. Id. at 860-61, 479 N.W.2d at 445-46.
119. Id. at 861-62, 479 N.W.2d at 446.
120. Id. at 863, 479 N.W.2d at 447.
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plaintiff in Schiup but strongly disagreed in the way it was done, espe-
cially in light of the recent decisions in Maxson and Vencil.121 Justice
Shanahan noted that the court had rejected Dan Vencil's compensa-
tion because there was no identifiable moment that produced objective
symptoms which required medical attention and the interruption or
discontinuance of employment. He then drew a comparison between
the cumulative back injury contained in Vencil and the cumulative
wrist and arm injury contained in Schlup. He concluded that the inju-
ries were virtually identical in nature except for two dissimilarities,
those being the duration of the employment of the parties and the
compensation allowed.12 2 Justice Shanahan correctly identified two
major inconsistencies that may be gleaned from a careful comparison
of Schlup and Vencil. First, a cumulative injury that occurred within
a five year period could be compensated as an accident, while a condi-
tion that accumulated only after ten years could not.123 Second, a cu-
mulative condition that affected the wrists and arms could be
compensated under the definition of an accident, while a cumulative
back injury would be offered no such protection by the Act.'24 Justice
Shanahan strongly criticized the way the court distinguished the facts
of Schlup and Vencil, but concluded that because the plaintiff in
Schiup had proven that her injury was a compensable occupational
disease the decision was to be affirmed.125
A full analysis of the court's decision in Schiup provides strong
support for Justice Shanahan's argument that the bilateral carpal tun-
nel ought to have been compensated as an occupational disease rather
than as an accident. While Justice Shanahan correctly identified the
nebulous distinctions between Schiup and Vencil that led to the diver-
gent conclusions in the cases, he declined to compare Schiup with
Maxson, which originally provided the misinterpretation of Crosby v.
American Stores. A comparison of the particular facts of Schiup and
Maxson, notwithstanding the obvious misinterpretation of Crosby that
Maxson produced, provides a strong basis for Justice Shanahan's con-
121. Id. at 867, 479 N.W.2d at 449 (Shanahan, J., concurring).
122. Schlup v. Auburn Needleworks, 239 Neb. 854, 867-68, 479 N.W.2d 440, 449-50
(1992) (Shanahan, J., concurring). The factors Justice Shanahan used to make
the comparison were (1) the plaintiff's age at the time of injury; (2) the year the
plaintiff began employment; (3) the duration of employment; (4) the type of
work activity; (5) the year of the first observation of any physical problem;
(6) the diagnosis of the physical condition; (7) the nature of the injury; (8) the
medical history of the plaintiff; (9) the type of activity that caused the condition;
(10) the effects of the injury; (11) the medical treatment required to relieve the
effects of the condition; (12) the disability due to the injury; (13) whether there
was an identifiable moment of injury; and (14) whether compensation was
allowed.
123. Id. at 870, 479 N.W.2d at 451.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 871, 479 N.W.2d at 451.
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clusion that the court erred in compensating plaintiff in Schiup for a
work-related accident while precluding compensation as an accident
for the plaintiffs in Maxson and Vencil.
As was the case in Schlup, the plaintiff in Maxson suffered a cumu-
lative-effect injury sustained over a period of time. The plaintiff be-
gan work for his employer in 1970 and experienced some discomfort
throughout his employment. The plaintiff in Maxson, however, con-
tinued to work past the initial signs of the pain. The plaintiff began to
feel serious cumulative effects of the job in 1987 and was forced to
seek further medical attention in 1988. Tests revealed that the plain-
tiff suffered from a combination of degenerative musculoskeletal
problems. The plaintiff was advised to restrict his future work activi-
ties to light lifting only.1 26
The factual similarities between Schiup and Maxson are obvious.
If the court in Maxson had attempted to ram the injury into the statu-
tory definition of accident as strenuously as the court in Schiup did,
the plaintiff in Maxson could have also been compensated under the
Act as sustaining a work-related injury due to an accident. An analy-
sis of the factors of an "accident" as applied to the injury in Maxson
reveals the arbitrary nature of the court's finding of compensability of
the injury in Schiup compared to the denial of benefits in Maxson.
The plaintiff in Maxson undoubtedly did not expect or foresee the
degenerative back condition any more than the plaintiff in Schiup ex-
pected to suffer from carpal tunnel syndrome. There is no difference,
therefore, between Schiup and Maxson with respect to the first re-
quirement of the statutory definition of accident. Similarly, the injury
in Maxcson produced the most obvious of objective symptoms: pain.
This symptom has been held by the court as sufficient to satisfy the
third requirement of the accident definition.127 Therefore, the only
possible factor upon which to distinguish Schiup from Maxson is the
requirement that the injury occur at an identifiable time as required
by the second element of the accident definition.
The purpose of the "suddenly or violently" requirement is not sim-
ply to classify injuries as particularly sudden or violent in nature. In-
stead, the purpose of the "suddenly and violently" specification is to
distinguish compensable injuries from chronic conditions that gradu-
ally develop and cannot be traced to a particular job or activity of the
worker.128 If that indeed is the purpose of the of the "suddenly and
violently" requirement, the testimony of the plaintiff's expert in Max-
son clearly established a causal link between the employment and the
126. Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co., 238 Neb. 209, 211, 469 N.W.2d 542, 543 (1991).
127. E.g., Sandel v. Packaging Co. of America, 211 Neb. 149,317 N.W.2d 910 (1982). The
court stated that the presence of pain, among other things, may constitute objec-
tive symptoms as required by the Act. Id. at 157-58, 317 N.W.2d at 915-16.
128. Schlup v. Auburn Needleworks, 239 Neb. 854, 861, 479 N.W.2d 440, 446 (1992).
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injury. Therefore, the plaintiff in Maxson met the second element of
the accident statute by tracing the injury to the particular job which
led to the injury.
Furthermore, the court's attempt to distinguish the facts of Sch1up
from the facts of Maxson on the basis of the number of years of the
employment has no relevance as to whether an "identifiable time" of
injury could be established.129 Whether the injured employee worked
for eighteen weeks or eighteen years, the employee could satisfy the
third requirement of the accident statute upon a showing of an identi-
fiable time of injury. The Schiup court found that when the injured
party realized that the pain had increased to the point of substantially
interfering with work and sought medical treatment, an identifiable
point had been established. This reasoning applies afortiori to the in-
jury sustained in Maxson. In Maxson, then, the identifiable moment
occurred when the injured plaintiff was substantially impaired from
continuing his job and sought medical attention. Thus, the injury in
Maxson could both be traced to a particular job and could be identified
at an identifiable point. The tracing of the injury to an identifiable
point in time was as least as accurate in Maxson as was the finding of
the injury in Schlup. It is both irrelevant and disingenuous to distin-
guish the facts of Schlup and Maxson solely on the basis of the dura-
tion of employment. Because the plaintiff in Maxson could have
pointed to an identifiable time of injury, an accident could have been
established within the meaning of the Act that was at least as credible
as the accident the court compensated in Schlup.
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Vencil and
Mavson severely limit the number and type of injuries which the legis-
lature intended to compensate. Instead of showing that the injured
employee had contracted a gradual, cumulative effect-type condition
that he would not have contracted but for his job as required by the
occupational disease statute, the injured employee must search for an
identifiable time the injury occurred, show that the injury resulted in
objective symptoms at the time of the injury, and show that medical
attention was sought within a reasonable time after the injury.
129. Nowhere in the statute does it mention that the duration of employment is a
consideration for compensability. Moreover, a "moment" is generally accepted to
be "a specific point in time." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 456 (ed., 1980). Thus, the only requirement necessary to fix an identi-
fiable point of injury is to locate the specific point in time that the injury oc-
curred, which the court in Schiup found to be the point in time when the injured
party realized that the pain had increased to the point that it substantially inter-
fered with the employment and medical attention was required. The specific
point in time could therefore be found regardless of the duration of employment.
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Human nature, however, dictates that many conscientious employees
will not seek immediate medical attention at the first minor twinge of
pain, but will continue to work until the pain prevents it. By working
through the pain, the employee runs the risk of incurring a cumula-
tive injury that is only compensable under the strict statutory require-
ments of an accident and, as both Vencil and Maxson illustrate, would
probably fail to meet the criteria. Because all occupational diseases are
gradual and may be fairly characterized as cumulative, what the court
has done, in effect, is to write the definition of occupational disease out
of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act by making the current
definition of "occupational disease" synonymous with "non-compensa-
ble." While the court may simply have intended to narrow the scope
of compensable diseases under the Act, Vencil and Maxson narrow
the scope to the point of non-existence.
The inconsistent results the court has reached by its decisions in
Schlup, Vencil, and Maxson reveal a misapplication of the intended
purpose and scope of workers' compensation law. The Maxson deci-
sion which precludes testing cumulative-effects injuries as occupa-
tional diseases forces a party who is injured from such a condition to
seek compensation as an accident under the Act. The court obviously
realized that, notwithstanding the fact that the injury was cumulative
in nature, the plaintiff in Schlup had to be somehow compensated. Its
reliance on precedent precluded the court from properly compensat-
ing the injury as an occupational disease. By forcing itself to charac-
terize the injury in Schlup as an accident and attempting to
distinguish the factually similar injuries in Vencil, the court has
turned any attempted recovery for any type of cumulative injury into
a breeding ground of uncertainty. While the characterization of the
injury in Schlup is inconsistent with the Act, it is better than nothing,
as it at least opens the door to recovery. The injured plaintiffs in
Vencil and Maxson, however, will receive no solace from that fact.
Craig Dirrim '93
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